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Reading Quicksilver: A Response to Pierre
d'Argent
DAVID A. WESTBROOKt

My friend Pierre d'Argent's essay in this volume, Which
Law Through Which War: Law Through War Revisited, refers to and builds on an earlier work of mine (a work which
owes a great deal to Pierre, a fact he modestly underplays),
as refracted through years of subsequent discussion on the
relationships of laws to wars. In such an ongoing conversation, published texts-relatively formal, and addressed to
third parties-are delivered out of a context that the reader
must surmise, like a theatergoer who has arrived late, to
find the actors already embroiled. So a brief response, and
a bit of guidance for Pierre's readers, seems in order.
First, however, I must acknowledge that Pierre's reading of my essay is very generous (I am tempted to say
Pierre has read very well, and so he is merely accurate-ah
vanity). More seriously, my "Law Through War" was an effort to articulate liberalism militant, and in so doing, to
take a stance toward international law markedly different
from the positions so boringly well established within the
academy. Pierre has brilliantly extended this enterprise
both substantively and with regard to subsequent wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq-he understands the consequences of
liberalism militant for public international law better than
I do.
Pierre's writing is difficult in part because he often selfconsciously contradicts himself. His work exhibits a beautiful tension between a desire to maintain a classical, very
continental, view of international law, in which law is a
formally coherent system of restraints on the exercise of
political power, and a critical (or poetic) stance in which law
is seen as the articulation of commitments-the American
lawyer might recall Holmes' "felt necessities"-that are
themselves often inchoate, the terrain that "Law Through
t Professor of Law, University at Buffalo, State University of New York.
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War" tried to excavate. It is not at all clear that the com-

mitments of our time, ranging from our understanding of
globalization to political identity to the literally hegemonic
power of the United States can be more than awkwardly
formalized through the Westphalian conceptual structure
that undergirds the public international law tradition. As a
result, public international law is a profoundly vexed discourse. Pierre knows this (it is my role in our conversations
to argue along these lines), and so, for all the creativity of
his thought, he is fighting an essentially defensive battle:
Pierre is trying to defend the 19th and 20th century project
of using international law to civilize politics, a project which
lately seems more difficult than ever before. But unlike
most international legalists, he does not resort to utopian
formalism and therapeutic denunciation, nor does he despair altogether in order to espouse a vulgar "realism." For
me at least, his effort has the nobility of the rearguard
action.
From this perspective, it is intellectually dramatic,
startling, to read Pierre arguing that international law is
only indirectly about the prohibition of war. Using law to
prevent war is what members of the international law
community-people in many different countries who understood themselves as part of an idealistic and progressive
movement - thought they were about at least since the U.S.
and Great Britain submitted their dispute over the
Alabama to arbitration. But Pierre powerfully argues that
war is not the central concern of the Westphalian order of
essentially liberal relations among (when possible) liberal
states that produces public international law. Instead,
Pierre argues, the constitutional law of the Westphalian
order is the expansion, replication and preservation of the
structure of that order itself. War tends to disrupt the
order, and therefore, generally speaking, is prohibited.
Acknowledging that peace is not the core aspiration of public international law may constitute the "beginning of the
maturity" of the system; the passage to maturity is the
subordination of youth's ideals to pragmatic concerns for
self-preservation. Pierre may well be right, but it remains
to be seen whether the international law community can
sustain such a chastened view of its purpose.
Pierre's diction is so well-mannered that the reader
may not notice just how substantial a break with the orthodox view this essay represents. It is of course true that
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international law has never been completely opposed to
war. War has been justified within public international
law, by various notions of just war, in accordance with the
U.N. Charter (under articles 2(4) and 51), or sometimes
outside the Charter (notably the NATO bombing of Kosovo
in 1999), but at least in the 20th century the international
legal system as a whole has been universally understood to
be constituted by the desire for peace. The U.N. itself was
established to save the world "from the scourge of war," in
the words of its Charter. In "Law Through War" I argued
that the willingness of international legalists to go to war in
Kosovo, Rwanda, and elsewhere, with or without the
Charter, bespoke something darker if perhaps morally justifiable: the prosecution of politics through war entailed a
distinction between civilized and barbarian that well
meaning people in advanced countries would be hesitant to
articulate. The willingness of many elites to go to war in
Dafur is a contemporary example. But even here, the purpose of war would be "to prepare people for [peaceful]
politics." In this view, international law aspires to peace,
even as it authorizes war.
But maybe my view is too sunny. Spurred by the U.S.
led wars in Afghanistan and especially Iraq, Pierre asks an
even more uncomfortable question: what about wars, such
as the U.S. war in Iraq, which are understood to be both
illegal and not justified by some larger commitment. What
then? Pierre finds-and the evidence supports him-that
the resolution of procedurally illegal wars that have
substantive outcomes in accordance with the core commitments of the system (an expansive view of territorial
sovereignty and self determination) will be treated as legal.
In short, a state may win both an illegal war and a legal
peace, as the Security Council itself appears to have
acknowledged, in calling for support of the new regime in
Iraq. The international response to the U.S. victory in Iraq
demonstrates that what we had thought was the fundamental rule of international law has been watered down almost
beyond recognition. War is not prohibited absolutely; war
is not allowed only in special situations, such as selfdefense and genocide; war is strongly discouraged because
it tends to disrupt the liberal order, the post colonial map.
But a peace that preserves or even extends the liberal order
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will be accepted, even if this state of affairs was brought
about by an illegal war. It is quite a disappointment.'
Acknowledging that procedurally illegal wars that
produce outcomes in accordance with the substantive commitments of the Westphalian system will be ratified
("digested") by the system, and ultimately acknowledged as
legitimate, places the law of war, especially the international legal process for going to war, under great stress.
Specifically, why is Security Council authorization for the
use of force necessary, if a war that respects territorial
sovereignty and self determination, both very broadly
construed, will ultimately be accepted by the international
community? Rephrased, from an American legal realist
perspective, the question of legality can only be decided on
the basis of outcomes: remedies, not mere words, demonstrate what a society believes to be legal and illegal.
Although Pierre explicitly rejects this perspective, by the
time he has derided the technicality of Security Council
procedure, and noted that circumvention of that procedure
does not preclude the legality of a war's outcomes, it is not
clear what the importance of Security Council procedure for
authorizing war is.
Confronted with this problem, Pierre argues professionally, from the perspective of public international law.
And from this professional perspective the question is not
very hard: procedural legality must mean in accordance
with the legal processes established by public international
law, which themselves reflect the liberal order. If there
must be war, it should be in accordance with the procedures
of the liberal order, especially the Charter. Yes, of course,
but what else could an international lawyer argue?
While easily defensible, Pierre's defense of established
international legal process is painfully insufficient, as his
conclusion indicates. The problem is that international legal process is a liberal articulation of the relations among
states. But as "Law Through War" emphasized, our wars
tend to be at the edges of the liberal order, not within it.
Wars are now rarely organized by states, and relations
1. As Pierre suggests en passant,it could be argued that the outcomes of the
invasion of Iraq were recognized as legal by the Security Council and the rest of
the world demonstrates U.S. hegemony, rather than a heretofore unrecognized
character of the Westphalian system. There is much more to be said on both
sides of this proposition, but again, Pierre is fighting a rearguard action.
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among the parties cannot sensibly be characterized in the
institutional terms on which contract, treaty, and hence the
liberal order, depend. Failed states, violent ethnic groups,
the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, and most dramatically, bin
Laden's war are hardly the actions of states, nor do the parties strive for liberal virtues. Nor are the control of Iraq
under the sanctions regime established after the first Gulf
War, the U.S. response to terrorism after 9/11, or U.S.
hegemony more generally to be understood primarily in
terms of negotiations among sovereign equals. Thus, while
I believe Pierre is correct that our wars may be justified ex
post in terms of the Westphalian structure they establish,
contemporary decisions to go to war, and hence our understanding of the law of war, can hardly if at all be understood in such terms. As I understand this conversation,
now well into its second decade, the topic has become what,
if anything, do our laws-our felt necessities-have to say
about our wars, violence which, while organized, is not
organized in such ways that we may talk seriously about
the breach of otherwise liberal relations among states.

